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DEFENDING CATEGORICAL
EXEMPTIONS TO THE DEATH PENALTY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ABA’S
RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE
EXECUTION OF JUVENILES AND
PERSONS WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION
CAROL STEIKER* AND JORDAN STEIKER**
I
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) recent call for a moratorium
1
on the imposition of capital punishment constitutes a dramatic escalation of
the ABA’s efforts to improve the American death penalty system. Over the
past twenty years, the ABA has focused on particular aspects of state practices
and recommended piecemeal reforms relating to competency of counsel, postconviction review, race discrimination, and the execution of juveniles and per2
sons with mental retardation. Recognizing that each of these prior resolutions
has essentially fallen on deaf ears, and that current death penalty “reforms”
have run in the opposite direction of its proposals, the ABA concluded that the
overall system surrounding the American death penalty had become “so seri3
ously flawed” that a stronger position was warranted.
We are sympathetic to the ABA’s global approach to the administration of
the death penalty in this country and have elsewhere taken stock of the courts’
quarter-century effort to regulate state capital systems via the Eighth and Four4
teenth Amendments. In this article, we address the ABA’s resolutions re5
garding the execution of juveniles and persons with mental retardation. AlCopyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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1. See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 3, 1997), reprinted in
Appendix, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Autumn 1998).
2. See American Bar Ass’n, Report No. 107 (1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 1, at 220.
3. Id. at 2.
4. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
5. In 1983, the ABA announced its policy calling for exemption from the death penalty for persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses; in 1989, the ABA announced its policy
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though we agree with the ABA’s bottom line in these areas—that such persons
should be exempted from execution—we believe that the strongest legal case
for that position requires a more nuanced and intricate argument than the
ABA has thus far advanced in its resolutions.
The ABA has joined other advocates of exemption (including litigators,
commentators, and dissenting judges) in maintaining that juveniles and persons
with mental retardation should be spared the death penalty because such application of the punishment is contrary to evolving standards of decency. According to this view, various legislative provisions that allow for the execution
of juveniles and mentally retarded persons conflict with an emerging national
6
consensus about the appropriateness of the death penalty for such persons. In
legal terms, this claim about the harshness of the death penalty as applied to
certain offenders is framed as an Eighth Amendment proportionality claim:
Juveniles and mentally retarded persons should be exempted on the ground
that they invariably lack the level of culpability necessary to “deserve” the ultimate sanction according to contemporary community standards.
Proportionality analysis, though, provides a weak foundation for categorical
exemptions in the death penalty context. From a purely doctrinal perspective,
the United States Supreme Court has shown increasing hostility to the whole
proportionality enterprise, with at least some members of the Court disclaiming
any constitutional authority to adjudge the severity of a punishment in relation
7
to the offense or offender. More broadly, the Court has had difficulty articulating a workable, principled approach in proportionality cases, and the few instances in which the Court has exempted classes of offenders are less than per8
suasive on their own terms.
We believe that the exemption of juveniles and mentally retarded persons
can be better defended by invoking several of the prominent strands of current
death penalty jurisprudence traceable to the Court’s foundational capital cases.
The pillars of modern doctrine—the requirements of (1) narrowing the class of
the death eligible, (2) channeling the discretion of capital sentencers, (3) ensuring effective consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, and (4) securing heightened reliability in the procedures leading to the imposition of the
death penalty—together provide an impressive case for exempting juveniles
and mentally retarded persons from the death penalty. Moreover, appealing to

calling for the prevention of executing mentally retarded persons. See American Bar Ass’n, Report to
the House of Delegates (1983) [hereinafter ABA Report (1983)]; American Bar Ass’n, Report to the
House of Delegates (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report (1989)].
6. Of the 40 death penalty jurisdictions, 11 states and the federal government currently prohibit
the execution of mentally retarded persons; 14 require offenders to have reached 18 at the time of the
crime to be death-eligible.
7. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976-90 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing against recognition and application of Eighth Amendment proportionality
doctrine).
8. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (invalidating death sentence as applied to
defendant who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (invalidating death sentence for crime of rape).

STEIKER.FMT.DOC

05/18/99 3:44 PM

Page 89: Autumn 1998] EXEMPTIONS TO THE DEATH PENALTY

91

these aspects of the Court’s distinctive death penalty jurisprudence avoids the
most significant pitfalls of seeking exemption based on the more general proportionality doctrine.
In the first section of this article, we describe the origins of the Court’s current constitutional regulation of the death penalty. We then critically examine
the Court’s proportionality methodology and illustrate the weaknesses of
seeking exemption via that doctrine. Finally, we argue that the Court’s distinctive death penalty jurisprudence, though it shares many of the concerns of the
proportionality doctrine, offers a firmer and more promising basis for exempting juveniles and mentally retarded persons from the death penalty.
II
BACKGROUND
For the first 175 years of our country’s history, the Constitution was not
construed to place any limits on the states’ ability to impose capital punish9
ment. The few challenges that reached the United States Supreme Court during this period were relatively modest; they did not question the constitutionality of the death penalty itself but instead sought to preclude particularly brutal
10
or novel means of execution. After all, the death penalty had existed as a
mode of punishment both in England and the colonies, and the text of the Constitution itself appears to contemplate permissible applications of the death
11
penalty.
In rejecting these challenges, the Court acknowledged that the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments forbids
barbaric executions—such as burning at the stake or crucifixion—but does not
12
preclude less painful means such as the firing squad and electrocution. Indeed, the Court refused to interfere in the case of an inmate who objected to
“death by installments”; the inmate had been placed in the electric chair and
the switch had been thrown, but no shock had been administered because of
13
mechanical failure. The Court, recognizing that “[a]ccidents happen,” found
no constitutional impediment to a second state attempt to extinguish the in14
mate’s life “humanely.”
The historical and textual support for the death penalty was buttressed by
the Court’s longstanding doctrinal conclusion that the Eighth Amendment con-

9. As a prominent death penalty scholar observed in 1968, “not a single death penalty statute, not
a single statutorily imposed mode of execution, not a single attempted execution has ever been held by
any court to be ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ under any state or federal constitution.” Hugo Adam
Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 201, 228-29.
10. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding electrocution).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (referring to “capital” crimes and requiring due process of law before deprivations of “life”).
12. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47 (holding that burning or crucifixion would be forbidden, but
electrocution was permissible); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (upholding firing squad).
13. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 474 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 462, 464.
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15

strained only federal (and not state) practices. Eventually, and perhaps inevitably, the Warren Court’s dramatic “incorporation” (and application against
the states) of virtually all of the protections for criminal defendants in the Bill
of Rights led to a judicial reassessment of the death penalty’s place in our constitutional scheme.
The first suggestion that the Court might regulate state death penalty practices appeared not in a Court decision, but in a 1963 Court order announcing
16
the denial of two petitions for certiorari. The petitions, like the constitutional
challenges of the earlier era, did not contend that the death penalty itself was
an impermissible punishment; instead, the petitions maintained that the death
17
penalty was excessive when imposed for the crime of rape. Justice Goldberg,
writing for himself and two other Justices, maintained that the questions raised
18
by the petitions were worthy of the Court’s attention.
19
Almost a decade later, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court entertained a
more encompassing challenge to the death penalty. Buoyed by a decline in
popular support for the death penalty (as well as a sharp decrease in the number of executions actually implemented), opponents of the death penalty
sought a sweeping declaration that the death penalty was no longer consistent
with contemporary American values. The Court’s ultimate decision, although
often erroneously portrayed as “abolishing” the death penalty on these broad
grounds, did not declare (and the Court has never declared) that capital punishment is invariably “cruel and unusual” punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall supported so expansive a
20
holding. Furman did, however, make clear that prevailing state death penalty
21
practices were unconstitutional.
The scope and meaning of Furman is unusually elusive—even as Supreme
Court opinions go—because there is no “majority” or even “plurality” opinion
which details the reasoning of the Court; the five majority Justices wrote separate, extensive, and at times conflicting accounts explaining their joint conclusion that the sentences obtained under the challenged statutes were unconstitutional.
The common thread of the opinions focused on the infrequency of death
sentences and executions, which generated two separate concerns. First, the
paucity of death sentences and executions was difficult to square with the ex15. The Court first held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
applicable against the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating punishment
for addiction to narcotics).
16. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Snider v. Cunningham, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
17. See Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Snider, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
18. See Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Snider, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
19. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20. See id. at 305-06, 369-71 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
21. See id. at 239.
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traordinarily broad state statutes that rendered virtually all murderers (and of22
ten rapists and armed robbers) “death eligible.” Although the state statutes
permitted enormous numbers of offenders to be sentenced to death, the statutes
23
never required that death be imposed. Worse still, the statutes offered no cri24
teria at all for choosing between life and death. This tremendous disparity between the death penalty’s availability and its use, together with the absence of
meaningful guidance, suggested strongly that death sentences were meted out
arbitrarily; there was simply no reliable evidence suggesting that the few persons sentenced to death and executed were truly the “worst” offenders among
25
the broad death eligible class. Indeed, “arbitrary” administration of the death
penalty seemed like an optimistic assessment; available statistical and anecdotal evidence suggested that the rare death sentences and executions secured
during this period were disproportionately distributed to poor and minority of26
fenders.
Second, the rarity of death sentences and executions undermined the states’
27
arguments regarding the necessity of the death penalty. In the absence of significant numbers of executions, states had difficulty defending a plausible deterrent or retributive function of the death penalty within their schemes.
Moreover, the extremely limited use of the death penalty (in view of its wide
availability) pointed to the absence of “will” on the part of various actors
within state systems—prosecutors, jurors, and judges—to utilize the punishment, which in turn might have reflected an emerging societal consensus that
the punishment was excessive or barbaric notwithstanding its legislative
authorization.
Ultimately, states reaffirmed their commitment to the death penalty in the
28
wake of Furman. When the Court reviewed the new schemes in 1976, it retreated from any suggestion that the death penalty was inconsistent with con22. See, e.g., id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The outstanding characteristic of our present
practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it.”); id. at 309
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (leaving open the possible constitutionality of a mandatory death penalty); id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he Georgia and Texas Legislatures have
not provided that the death penalty shall be imposed upon all those who are found guilty of forcible
rape.”); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (“The narrower question to which I address myself concerns
the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes under which . . . the legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind of case.”).
24. For example, the Georgia statute reviewed in Furman afforded the jury absolute discretion to
sentence a defendant convicted of forcible rape to death, life imprisonment, or “imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years;” the Texas rape law consolidated for review in the same case allowed the jury to impose punishment “by death or by confinement
in the penitentiary for life, or any term of years not less than five.” Id. at 308 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969), and TEX.
PENAL CODE art. 1189 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 250-53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., id. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (noting that under discretionary capital punishment
schemes, “legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed”).
28. See Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2594 (1996) (discussing states’ responses to Furman).
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29

temporary standards of decency. The Court’s regulation of state death penalty practices thereafter has focused on several overlapping and to some extent
inconsistent principles. First, states must meaningfully narrow the class of
death eligible offenders to ensure that those sentenced to death are truly
30
among the “worst” offenders. This “narrowing requirement” flows primarily
from the empirically observed chasm between the numbers of death eligible defendants and the number of defendants actually sentenced to death and exe31
cuted. Second, states must channel discretion to ensure that sentencers remain focused on relevant, clearly identified criteria as they decide between life
32
and death. Third, states must protect the right of capital defendants to present and have considered any mitigating factors calling for a sentence less than
33
death. Although this requirement of individualization is in substantial tension
with the concept of state-provided guidance (because individualization essentially cuts the sentencer loose from state-defined criteria), the Court has in34
sisted that both must be fulfilled to reduce arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
Lastly, the Court has articulated a general requirement of heightened reliability
35
in light of the difference in kind between death and all other punishments.
III
PROPORTIONALITY
Soon after the Court approved several of the new schemes adopted in the
wake of Furman, it revisited the question that it had refused to address in 1963:
36
whether the death penalty is an excessive punishment for the crime of rape.
The Court’s resulting plurality decision in Coker v. Georgia invalidated the
37
death penalty as grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape.
Despite the tremendous significance of the case, and the remarkable
breadth of its holding in light of prior decisions, the Court’s defense of its ruling
in Coker is both brief and unsatisfying. As an initial matter, the plurality assumed, with little discussion, that the Constitution contains a proportionality
guarantee that authorizes courts to review the appropriateness of a punishment

29. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)
(remarking that “it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as
an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction”).
30. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 372-78.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 378-89.
33. See id. at 389-96.
34. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 859-66 (1992) (book review) (discussing tension
between dual requirements of channeling discretion and facilitating individualized sentencing).
35. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 397-403.
36. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
37. See id. at 592. Although the victim of the defendant’s crime was 16, the Court qualified its
holding by insisting that death was an excessive punishment for the crime of raping an “adult” woman.
See id.

STEIKER.FMT.DOC

05/18/99 3:44 PM

Page 89: Autumn 1998] EXEMPTIONS TO THE DEATH PENALTY

95

38

in light of an offender’s crime. Although it is perfectly plausible to locate such
a proportionality principle within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court had never firmly embraced such a doctrine.
Indeed, the Coker plurality cited just five cases spanning seventy years as establishing a proportionality doctrine, all of which could have been explained on
39
other grounds.
Having conclusorily established the existence of a proportionality guarantee, the plurality self-consciously sought to limit its intrusiveness by ensuring
that the Court’s proportionality judgments “should not be, or appear to be,
40
merely the subjective views of individual Justices.” Accordingly, the plurality
maintained that their judgments should be guided “to the maximum possible
extent” by “objective factors” such as public attitudes, history, precedent, leg41
islative attitudes, and jury behavior.
The plurality’s application of these factors in Coker was remarkably unpersuasive. The plurality relied heavily on the fact that at the time of its decision,
Georgia was alone in authorizing the death penalty for the crime of raping an
42
adult woman. But just five years before, sixteen states and the federal gov43
ernment had permitted rape to be punishable by death. Had public opinion
and contemporary values shifted so precipitously in a half decade? Clearly the
Court’s decision in Furman had encouraged states to redraft their statutes, and
eleven states adopted mandatory death penalty provisions in the (ultimately
misguided) hope that maximum guidance would cure the unconstitutional arbi44
trariness that the Court had identified in Furman. That only two of these
38. See id.
39. See id. at 592 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); and Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). In Weems, the Court invalidated a bizarre set of punishments inflicted on a public official who was convicted of falsifying an official document in the United Statescontrolled Philippine Islands. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-58. The 15-year sentence included terms
requiring him to be chained at the ankle and wrists while he performed hard and painful labor. See id.
at 364. Although some language in Weems suggests the existence of a proportionality guarantee, the
decision is better understood to prohibit barbaric punishments regardless of the underlying offense.
See id. at 365-67. Similarly, in Trop, the Court seemed more concerned with the nature of the punishment—stripping the defendant of his natural-born citizenship—than its severity in relation to his offense of desertion during war. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 90-93. In Robinson, the Court invalidated an extremely modest punishment (“not less than ninety days nor more than one year in the county jail”)
because it was imposed based on the defendant’s status of being an addict rather than for the commission of a particular criminal act; the opinion suggests that no criminal liability could be justified (hence,
proportionality does not seem to explain the decision). Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661 n.1, 667. In Furman,
several members of the Court hinted at a proportionality rationale for prohibiting the death penalty
for all crimes, but the decision could not fairly be read to have firmly established a general proportionality principle, especially given the myriad of conflicting rationales offered in the five opinions supporting the judgment. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. Lastly, in Gregg, the Court suggested
that the Constitution limits the imposition of excessive punishments, but upheld the death penalty
against a broad proportionality challenge. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69.
40. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 594-95.
43. See id. at 593.
44. See Steiker, supra note 28, at 2594.
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statutes continued to permit (and indeed required) the death penalty for rape
reflects, at most, a post-Furman sentiment that death is not invariably required
for the crime of rape. It cannot fairly be read, along the lines of the plurality
opinion, to reflect a newly emerged legislative consensus that death is never
justified for rape.
The plurality’s use of jury data is even more problematic. In support of its
national rule precluding use of the death penalty for rape, the plurality prominently cited a study of sixty-three rape cases in Georgia during the four years
preceding its decision, in which only six defendants had been sentenced to
45
death. The plurality seemed to regard as significant that within this sample,
“in the vast majority of cases, at least nine out of ten, juries have not imposed
46
the death sentence.”
Even accepting the dubious assumption that this data fairly demonstrates
Georgians’ repugnance toward punishing rape with death during the relevant
four-year period, it certainly cannot be construed to demonstrate any larger
emerging national consensus about the inappropriateness of the death penalty
for rape. The Court is, of course, constrained in its ability to develop constitutional facts necessary to reach its decisions; it cannot itself conduct sophisticated jury studies and must instead rely on the factual development by the parties in the lower courts. But the Court should at least be circumspect about its
appallingly loose use of statistics in cases like Coker; no professional sociologist
would dare venture an opinion about national values (or “evolving standards of
decency”) based on such limited data.
Ultimately, perhaps recognizing the weakness of its “objective” evidence,
the plurality retreated to its “own judgment” that the crime of rape is simply
47
not serious enough to permit the death penalty. Although “[l]ife is over for
the victim of murder[,] for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
48
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.” These reflections
likewise provide a thin basis for establishing a firm national rule. One can regard rape as less damaging than murder and still believe that some rapes should
be punishable by death. Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger argued in dissent,
the plurality’s “subjective” analysis appeared to constitutionalize a version of
lex talionis by seemingly insisting on a defendant’s taking life before becoming
49
death eligible. Strong moral arguments can be made on behalf of such a limitation on the death penalty’s use, but it is difficult to see why the plurality’s
moral perception should automatically be elevated to a constitutional rule.
Strikingly absent in Coker was any reference to what most death penalty
critics would regard as the central indictment of the states’ use of the death
penalty for rape. Both at the time of Justice Goldberg’s opinion respecting de-

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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nial of certiorari in 1963 and the Court’s decision in Coker in 1977, it was all too
apparent that the death penalty was not generally available for the crime of
rape; it was available for the crime of interracial rape by African-African men
50
of white women in a specific geographical region. In the half-century before
Coker, over ninety-five percent of the executions for rape in the United States
occurred in former Confederate states, and an overwhelming number of the
executions involved African-American defendants convicted of raping white
51
victims. In Texas, the largest executioner of rapists during the period, eightyone of the ninety-nine persons executed were African-Americans convicted of
raping whites, even though a substantial majority of the 2,308 rapists convicted
52
during the period were white or Hispanic and a significant number of victims
53
were non-white. Rape offenders generally were sentenced to death in about
54
one in eighteen cases, but African-Americans who were convicted of raping
white victims were approximately thirty-five times more likely to be sentenced
55
to death than prison.
Given the historical role of race in punishing rapists with death, it is surprising that race is not mentioned either in Justice Goldberg’s opinion regarding certiorari or in Coker itself. More generally, Coker would have been a
much stronger opinion if, instead of endeavoring to gauge contemporary morality, the Court had invoked the broader concerns about arbitrariness articulated in the various opinions in Furman. Of course, the unwillingness of whites
to use the death penalty to punish white rapists or to avenge nonwhite victims
arguably supports the Court’s ultimate conclusion that society regards death as
an excessive punishment for rape. But the evident arbitrary and discriminatory
character of this nation’s history of punishing rape with death provides a
cleaner and more persuasive basis for prohibiting the practice than the weak
indicators of public opinion advanced by the Court.
Following Coker, the Court applied its proportionality methodology in En56
mund v. Florida to exempt one additional class of offenders: persons convicted via the felony-murder rule who did not themselves kill, intend to kill, or
attempt to kill. As in Coker, the Court engaged in its legislative head-counting
and concluded that the contemporary legislative judgment was against execut57
ing such offenders. As the Court conceded, its survey of legislative schemes
was even less persuasive than it was in Coker, because the Court’s parsing of
the various state statutes revealed that the relevant class of offenders would be

50. See JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, at 39-47 (1994).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 56.
53. See id. at 57.
54. See id. at 56.
55. See id.
56. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
57. See id. at 789-93.
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58

death eligible in as many as seventeen states. Evidence of jury practices was
somewhat stronger, in that few members of the class had been sentenced to
59
death nationwide over a several-decade period. But the Court did not provide
data that would have indicated whether juries had been given the opportunity
to execute offenders like Enmund who had neither killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill. Hence, it was not clear whether the paucity of such offenders
on death row reflected the considered moral judgment of juries or the exercise
of discretion elsewhere in the system (which might—but might not—accurately
reflect prevailing community values).
Overall, Coker and Enmund together reveal the difficulty the Court faces in
its efforts to discern evolving standards of decency. In its more recent decisions, the Court has rejected proportionality-based exemptions for juveniles
60
and persons with mental retardation.
Rather than rehashing the various
“objective” indicia of contemporary moral standards, we explore other routes
to exempting such offenders based on particular aspects of the Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence.
IV
EXEMPTING JUVENILES AND PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION FROM
EXECUTION BY ADHERING TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE
We believe there exists a solid foundation in both law and policy for exempting juveniles and persons with mental retardation from the ultimate sanction of
death—a foundation that avoids the pitfalls of the proportionality analysis conducted by the Supreme Court. Quite apart from the Court’s dubious proportionality doctrine, the rest of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence strongly
supports the exemptions called for by the ABA. Moreover, granting constitutional exemption from the death penalty to juveniles and persons with mental retardation not only would promote the central goals of the Supreme Court’s constitutional regulation of capital punishment, but also would interfere little with
the goals propounded by supporters of capital punishment.
It is puzzling that neither abolitionist litigators nor any member of the Supreme Court has mounted an argument against executing juveniles and persons
with mental retardation rooted in the central pillars of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. As we have sketched above and explained at length
61
elsewhere, the Court identified four central concerns about the pre-Furman
death penalty system when it began its regime of constitutional regulation of the
death penalty in 1972: the need for greater assurance of (1) individual desert; (2)

58. See id. at 792-93.
59. See id. at 794-96.
60. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (declining to exempt 16-year-olds from execution because of the absence of a discernible national consensus against practice of executing such offenders); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (declining to exempt persons with mental retardation
from execution because of absence of discernible national consensus).
61. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4.
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fairness across cases; (3) individualized consideration; and (4) heightened proce62
dural reliability. In time, the Court developed four doctrines to address these
four concerns: the doctrinal requirements of (1) narrowing the class of the death
eligible; (2) channeling the discretion of the capital sentencer; (3) permitting the
consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence; and (4) adapting procedures to
reflect the fact that “death is different” from all other punishments not only in
63
degree, but in kind. Yet, instead of starting from these pillars and asking what
they might imply about the execution of juveniles or persons with mental retardation, litigants and courts alike have tried to tease out a general “proportionality”
principle from the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits only disproportionate
punishments. Important as such a principle might be, however, there is no need
to rely upon it in questioning the application of the death penalty to the two
groups under discussion; rather, exempting these groups from execution would go
a long way toward furthering the more specific purposes of the Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence.
How does the Court’s jurisprudence support (indeed, require) the exemption
of juveniles and persons with mental retardation from the death penalty? Consider first the doctrinal requirement of “narrowing the class of the death eligi64
ble.” In the pre-Furman death penalty regimes, large numbers of convicted
criminal defendants were technically eligible for the death penalty under state
death penalty laws. Neither prosecutors nor sentencers were given any meaningful guidance by law regarding how to choose who should be executed. Moreover,
very few capital sentences were sought by prosecutors, and even fewer were im65
posed by sentencers (almost always juries). Hence, the Supreme Court expressed its concern in Furman that the death penalty appeared to be imposed in
an arbitrary (or worse, discriminatory) manner, striking like “lightning” and
therefore destroying confidence that the worst of the death eligible were being
66
selected for the worst punishment.
Note that this concern is a miniproportionality concern—it is a fear that some people were being selected to die
who were not sufficiently culpable to “deserve” that penalty. As the Court itself
explained, the narrowing requirement helps to ensure that a capital sentencing
scheme can “reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
67
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”
This concern led the Supreme Court to develop the doctrinal requirement of
“narrowing,” by which the Court sought to force state legislatures to designate in
advance those offenders most deserving of death. The Court has held that legislatures can meet this requirement either by refining their definitions of capital
murder such that only a subset of the worst murderers will be eligible for the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 361-71.
See id. at 371-401.
Id. at 372-78.
See Furman v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 238, 291-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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68

death penalty, or by providing for required findings of aggravating circumstances at sentencing hearings before “ordinary” murderers can be made eligible
69
for the death penalty. The Court has also approved, although not required, a
form of ex post narrowing; it has held that capital sentencing schemes are improved by the statutory requirement of case-by-case examination by appellate
courts to ensure that each sentence imposed is deserved in light of a particular ju70
risdiction’s actual sentencing practices. It makes perfect sense to regard categorical exemptions from the death penalty (such as the proposed exemptions for
juveniles and persons with mental retardation) through the lens of the Eighth
Amendment’s “narrowing” requirement rather than as a part of a grander theory
of constitutional proportionality, though to our knowledge, no litigant or court
has done so.
Of course, the Court’s narrowing doctrine, as currently elaborated, seems to
require merely that states designate a subset of murderers that they deem the
“worst” murderers to be eligible for the death penalty; the Court has declined to
impose through the narrowing requirement any substantive view of “better” or
“worse” murderers. And, as noted above, the Court seems right to conclude that
there no doubt exist some juveniles and some persons with mental retardation
who are sufficiently culpable so as to “deserve” execution as both a moral and a
legal matter. So why should the states not be free to include at least some young
or retarded defendants among the death eligible? How is it that the Court’s narrowing doctrine can be said to support or even require the wholesale exclusion of
juveniles and persons with mental retardation?
The narrowing argument, unlike the proportionality argument, does not rely
on establishing that no juvenile or mentally retarded person can be found to
“deserve” execution, morally or legally. Rather, the narrowing argument suggests that classes of defendants for whom there is a particularly high likelihood of
mistake about the question of desert should be exempted in order to assure that
those actually selected for the death penalty deserve it. In essence, the narrowing
argument is that states must be forced to exclude some who may deserve the
death penalty in order to assure that all of those who actually get the death pen71
alty deserve to get it. States might justifiably object to any constitutional narrowing requirement on the grounds suggested by Justice Harlan’s famous opinion
68. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (“The legislature may . . . narrow the definition of capital offenses . . . so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern [about narrowing
the class of the death eligible].”).
69. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (“[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty.”).
70. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (describing
Georgia’s case-by-case comparative proportionality review as a means of assuring that the death penalty is reserved for the most deserving defendants); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-54 (1984)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not invariably require comparative proportionality review
by state appellate courts).
71. To use terminology we have developed elsewhere, states should be forced to endure some
“underinclusion” in order to ensure that there is minimal “overinclusion” in the group of those subject to
capital punishment. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 366.
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for the Court in McGautha v. California —legislatures are simply unable to
“identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and . . . express these characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
73
authority.” States might thus claim that requiring them to designate subsets of
the “worst” murderers necessarily forces them to categorically exclude some who
might nonetheless deserve the penalty, all things considered. But the Supreme
Court has nonetheless insisted that narrowing is essential to ensure individual desert. In a similar vein, if the risk of error about desert could be shown to be high
enough in a particular group, the narrowing doctrine should require the exclusion
of that entire group.
We think juveniles and persons with mental retardation are just such
groups—groups about whom, when their members are aggregated, there is a substantial risk that an individual sentencer might err in concluding that an individual member of the group is appropriately subject to the death penalty. These are
the very points that the relevant ABA reports made eloquently as far back as
1983, when the ABA first announced its opposition to the imposition of capital
punishment upon “any person for any offense committed while under the age of
74
eighteen” and again in 1989, when it extended that opposition to include
75
“person[s] with mental retardation.” As for children, it is widely recognized
that adolescents are generally less developed both cognitively and in their ability
to control their behavior than fully mature adults. The 1983 ABA report noted
that “[m]ost would agree that adolescents live for today with little thought of the
future consequences of their actions. Their defiant attitude and risk-taking behavior is probably related to their developmental stage of defiance about danger
76
and death.” And given that “no adult with mental retardation has a mental age
77
higher than 12,” the argument that persons with mental retardation are unlikely
to achieve the requisite level of moral culpability for criminal wrongdoing to justify execution is at least as strong as that for juveniles.
Why is it not sufficient, as the Supreme Court has argued, to simply require
that each capital sentencer consider a defendant’s youth or mental retardation as
a mitigating factor? Why is blanket immunity required, or even helpful? The answer is that youth and mental retardation are conditions that not only frequently
render defendants incapable of achieving the sort of moral culpability that the
“worst” murderers must have to deserve the death penalty; these conditions also
are uniquely hard to convey as entirely mitigating in the capital sentencing context. The cognitive and volitional immaturity exhibited by many juveniles and
72. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (rejecting a due process challenge to uncontrolled capital sentencing discretion).
73. Id. at 204.
74. ABA Report (1983), supra note 5, at 1.
75. ABA Report (1989), supra note 5, at 1.
76. ABA Report (1983), supra note 5, at 8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
77. ABA Report (1989), supra note 5, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (citing AMERICAN ASS’N ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 33 (H. Grossman ed., 1983)).
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persons with mental retardation, while mitigating as regards the defendant’s personal culpability for criminal wrongdoing, is at the very same time clearly aggravating as regards the question of the defendant’s dangerousness in the future. Indeed, the more impaired an individual defendant is, the more powerful the
78
inference of future dangerousness. And a sentencer’s concerns about future
dangerousness are likely to loom disproportionately large, given that most jurors
(capital sentencing is almost invariably done by jury) vastly underestimate the
79
meaning of a “life” sentence. Moreover, defense lawyers are permitted to cor80
rect this routine misimpression only to a limited extent. Under these circumstances, there is an unacceptable likelihood that a juvenile or a person with mental retardation who is sentenced to die will have a degree of diminished
culpability insufficient to “reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sen81
tence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”
Indeed, the Court’s doctrine regarding individualized sentencing in the capital
context—from which flows its requirement that youth and mental retardation be
considered as “mitigating circumstances”—lends affirmative support to the argument that the Court’s narrowing doctrine requires the exemption of the young
and mentally retarded from the death penalty. As we have argued elsewhere, the
requirement of individualized sentencing derives from a commitment to individual moral culpability (as opposed to consequentialist concerns) as the central in82
quiry in a constitutional scheme of capital punishment. Youth and mental retardation are relevant to capital sentencing precisely because they are unusually
likely to reduce the defendant’s personal moral culpability for the criminal
wrongdoing at issue. Yet these qualities are at the same time not very amenable
to being taken fully into account through individualized consideration by sentencing juries. Risking the erroneous execution of those who lack the requisite
degree of moral culpability for their actions thus strikes at the very constitutional
heart of the Court’s impetus to regulate capital punishment under the Constitution.
83
The third and final pillar of the Court’s constitutional regulation of capital
punishment—the requirement of heightened procedural reliability—also sup78. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989) (suggesting that some types of mitigating
evidence might be treated as aggravating, given the state’s focus on future dangerousness in its capital
sentencing scheme); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
79. See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Cases, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999).
80. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (requiring that the defendant be permitted to inform his capital sentencing jury about his parole ineligibility under state law when the prosecutor argued that the defendant would pose a danger in the future). But see Brown v. Texas, 118 S. Ct.
354 (1997) (denying certiorari to a capital defendant whose future dangerousness was at issue under
state law but who was precluded from informing his sentencing jury that he would be ineligible for parole for 35 years under state law).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 69 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983)).
82. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 844-58.
83. We initially identified four pillars of the Court’s constitutional regulation of capital punishment—narrowing, channeling, permitting consideration of mitigating evidence, and requiring heightened procedural reliability. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (citing Steiker & Steiker, supra
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ports a categorical exemption from the death penalty for juveniles and persons
with mental retardation. The purpose of the Court’s “death is different” doctrine
is to ensure through adequate procedures that the decision to take a life, which is
greater in severity and finality than any other possible state sanction, is as reliable
as possible. This requirement has been applied not only to procedures related to
determinations of the defendant’s factual guilt or innocence of the underlying
crime, but also to determinations regarding the appropriateness of death as a sen84
tence. The requirement that death sentences be especially reliable can be promoted not only by procedures that reduce the chance of an erroneous outcome,
but by wholesale exclusions when the risk of error in particular categories is particularly high.
Thus, the requirements of narrowing, individualized consideration, and
heightened procedural reliability, when read together, support the categorical exemptions recommended by the ABA because such exemptions are likely the only
way to eliminate the substantial risk that would otherwise exist of a certain type
of moral and constitutional error. This argument proceeds directly from the particular concerns the Supreme Court identified at the commencement of its constitutional regulation of the death penalty as the central concerns of the Eighth
Amendment. And nothing in this argument depends on generating a convincingly calibrated “proportionality principle” that can tell us in every case whether
a punishment is constitutionally disproportionate. Rather, it depends only on
identifying crude, aggregate risks of constitutional error.
Moreover, exempting juveniles and persons with mental retardation also
would not impede the goals of capital punishment most frequently cited by proponents of the death penalty. Unlike many other changes to our system of capital
punishment urged by reformers, these exemptions would not make more difficult
or costly the administration of capital punishment generally, nor would it delay
the death sentences imposed upon others outside of the exempted groups. And
to the extent that capital punishment deters serious homicides generally (which
many proponents seem to believe it does), it seems unlikely that much of any deterrent effect is accomplished with juveniles or persons with mental retardation.
The very qualities that make these two groups generally less morally culpable for
criminal conduct also make them less likely to be able to process and act upon the
likelihood of execution as a penalty for certain proscribed actions. Indeed, the
deterrence argument is even weaker for persons with mental retardation than it is
for juveniles, given that persons with mental retardation have, at most, the cogni85
tive function of a pre-teen. And although any individual executed will certainly
be specifically deterred (that is, incapacitated) from committing any future crimes
note 4, at 371-403). As we explain in our longer work, the Court eventually abandoned channeling as
an independent requirement and instead folded it into the narrowing doctrine. See Steiker & Steiker,
supra note 4, at 378-89.
84. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1985) (invalidating death sentence when
prosecutor deliberately misled jury about the consequences of its sentencing decision by misstating the
scope of appellate review).
85. See ABA Report (1989), supra note 5, at 5.
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while imprisoned, this argument carries little water in the context of juveniles,
because “such irreversible giving up upon a person even before they emerge from
childhood is squarely in opposition to the fundamental premises of juvenile jus86
tice and comparable socio-legal systems.”
Arguments from retribution likewise have reduced force in the context of juveniles and persons with mental retardation. Retributive theories of justice are
87
essentially founded on the idea of desert. As we argued above, juveniles and
persons with mental retardation often (even though not invariably) fail to attain
the requisite degree of moral culpability for their wrongdoing to justify the death
penalty, and there is little reason to be confident that our current capital sentencing practices are satisfactory in ensuring that such insufficiently culpable individuals are winnowed out. In such circumstances, the goal of executing only
those truly deserving of the ultimate sanction would seem to be promoted rather
than defeated by the categorical exclusions suggested by the ABA.
Finally, many supporters of the death penalty point to its symbolic or expressive value—its ability to communicate our collective condemnation of horrible
acts of violence. While it is true that public acts of government necessarily
“speak” about our collective values, such acts do not always speak in one voice.
Exempting the very young and those with mental retardation from the ultimate
sanction also sends a message. This message is partly one of care and caution—a
signal that we wish to ensure that only the most culpable and degraded are subject to the special penalty that we reserve for “the worst of the worst.” But the
message is also one of hope for our collective future. As Clarence Darrow urged
in a capital sentencing proceeding in 1924, when he argued for the lives of Leopold and Loeb (who were eighteen and seventeen respectively at the time of their
notorious murder of fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks):
Your Honor stands between the past and the future. You may hang these boys; you
may hang them by the neck until they are dead. But in doing it you will turn your
face toward the past. In doing it you are making it harder for every other boy who, in
ignorance and darkness, must grope his way through the mazes which only childhood
knows. In doing it you will make it harder for unborn children. You may save them
and make it easier for every child that sometime may stand where these boys stand.
You will make it easier for every human being with an aspiration and a vision and a
hope and a fate.
I am pleading for the future. . . .88

Darrow’s future is now, and the ABA has appropriately taken up his plea at
this important time in the history of the death penalty.

86. ABA Report (1983), supra note 5, at 9.
87. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of the Victim, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION 139, 149 (Richard Mowery Andrews ed., 1997).
88. Darrow’s closing argument in the Leopold and Loeb case is printed in full in ATTORNEY FOR
THE DAMNED 86 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957).

